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Abstract 
I study the impact of media visibility of people of colour on the rate of hate crimes 
motivated by race or ethnicity in the United States. To do so, I construct a novel 
measure of state-level media visibility of people of colour between 2007 and 2013. 
Comparing state-level variation in the hate crime rate with a measure of the one-year 
lagged state-level variation in media visibility, I find that an increase in media 
visibility reduces the number of hate crimes. The effect is not larger in states that 
used to be pro-slavery, but larger in states that are more prone to spontaneous 
emotional outbursts of hate. The result, which is robust to several checks, is in the 
line with the argument that “visibility matters.”  
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1. Introduction 
It is often argued that an increase in media visibility of a minority group has a positive effect on 
the public opinions and beliefs about that minority group. One reason behind this is that media 
visibility of a group is a form of recognition that signals the relative social worth of that group 
(Hilton-Morrow and Battles, 2015). It can also increase information about the minority group 
that replaces incorrect or false beliefs and reduces prejudice, teaches the majority group about 
the minority group’s struggles, perspectives, and opinions, and reduce the majority group’s speed 
of implicit association between the minority group and negative traits (Allport, 1956; Bolzendahl 
and Myers, 2004; Fisher, et al., 2007; Greenberg, 1988; Reingold and Foust, 1998). If media 
visibility influences the accuracy of individual beliefs, it also affects the efficiency of democratic 
and economic systems (Della Vigna and Gentzkow, 2010). Recently, economists have become 
interested in the role of media on social tolerance, in particular when studying the role of 
negative media portrayals on nationalism and ethnic conflicts (DellaVigna et al., 2014; 
Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). The effect of general media visibility, however, on social tolerance 
has been largely ignored.  
In this paper, I use a novel measure of state-level variation in exposure to people of colour on 
television to study the effect of general media visibility of people of colour on social tolerance 
toward that group.1 I find that media visibility does matter. In my first set of results I find, after 
controlling for time varying covariates and for year, state and US census fixed effects, that an 
increase in media visibility of people of colour on television significantly reduces the number of 
hate crimes per 100.000 state populations the following year. In my second set of results I find 
that the results are not larger in states with a history of being less tolerant toward people of 
colour, proxied by whether the state used to be a member of the Confederate States of America, 
but it is larger in states where the population is more likely to make emotional and spontaneous 
racist outbursts, proxied by the state’s relative amount of hate speech on Twitter following US 
 
1
 A person of color refers to an individual that is Black, Latino/a, Asian-Pacific Islander, or 
“Other”. 
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President Barack Obama’s re-election in 2012.2 I also use the number of racist hate groups per 
100.000 state population as an alternative measure of social tolerance to study whether media 
visibility affects very intolerant individuals. I find no evidence that it does. This is indicative 
evidence that overall media visibility does not shift the whole distribution of tolerance. Instead, it 
seems to influence individuals at the margin with a relatively high level of social tolerance to 
begin with.  
As far as I am aware, this paper is the first to study the effect of general media visibility on 
hate crimes against people of colour. I focus on hate crimes against people of colour in the US 
for several reasons. First, people of colour constitutes a large share of the US population – 37.9 
percent in 2010 (Smith et al. 2016) – and the group’s relative status and rights, and inequalities 
in terms of wealth, health and wellbeing, racial profiling, etc. are continuously is at the centre of 
the political debate. Second, social tolerance is linked to several outcomes of interest to 
economists, such as income, wages, wage-differentials, growth, and happiness.3 Hate crimes are 
arguably the most extreme forms of social (in)tolerance. Social tolerance is also linked to social 
conflicts and can change voting preferences (US Department of Justice, 2001).4 Third, 
determinants of hate crime is an under-researched area that is quickly gaining more recognition. 
For example, in April 2017 the US Justice of Department announced a new subcommittee on 
hate crimes. Fourth, the media in the US has a long history of underrepresenting people of colour 
and this has lead to a lot of discussions on the matter.5,6 In other countries, several broadcasting 
 
2
 The Confederate States of America was a pro-slavery secessionist government created in 
1861. 
3
 See, for example, Charles and Guryan (2008), Florida and Gates (2001), Florida and 
Mellander (2010), Inglehart et al. (2008) Ottaviano and Peri  (2006). 
4
 The US Department of Justice writes: “Of all crimes, hate crimes are most likely to create or 
exacerbate tensions, which can trigger larger community-wide racial conflict, civil disturbances, 
and even riots” (US Department of Justice, 2001). 
5 In 2016, 28.3 percent of all speaking characters on screen (movie and television) in USA 
were from underrepresented racial or ethnic groups, which is 9.6 percentage points below the 
proportion in the US population (Smith et al., 2016). 22 percent of the stories on broadcasting 
networks failed to include any black or Asian speaking characters and over 50 fail to include an 
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companies have adopted policies to increase minority group representation with the motivation 
that representation is important.7 But do such changes in media content influence attitudes or do 
they simply reflect changes in attitudes in these societies. This paper aims to address that 
question. In doing so, it contributes to the to need to empirically understand the malleability of 
attitudes towards minority groups in order to understand the reason behind and address 
discrimination (Carrel et al., 2015). 
My empirical analysis uses a novel measure of state-level variation in exposure to people of 
colour on television. I construct my key independent variable by multiplying the annual 
proportion of series regular people of colour characters on broadcasting networks in USA 
between 2006 and 2012 with the predetermined 2003 state-level number of hours spent watching 
nonreligious television and movies. This gives me a plausible exogenous state-level variation of 
media visibility of people of colour on television between 2006 and 2012. In order to separate 
the effect of media visibility on the hate crime rate from other confounding factors, I compare 
state-level variation in the hate crime rate with my measure of the one-year lagged state-level 
variation in media visibility of people of colour. I also perform a number of checks to study the 
validity of the assumptions in my identification strategy. First, I show that viewers do not adjust 
their television watching habits given the media visibility of people of colour. Second, I show 
that producers and writers of shows do not change their content as a result of changes in the hate 
crime rate or general social tolerance. Third, a placebo test also shows that media visibility of 
people of colour does not affect crimes that social tolerance should not affect, such as vehicle 
                                                                                                                                                       
Asian speaking character. Smith et al. (2016) concludes that the media industry underperforms 
on racial and ethnic diversity when it comes to leads in films, series regulars on television, and 
all speaking characters.  
6
 For example, this was heavily discussed during the 2015 and 2016 Academy Award (Oscar) 
ceremonies, where none of the 20 nominees in the four actor categories were non-white, and in 
2017, when several winners were people of colour. 
7
 The UK broadcaster BSkyB has an initiative to have at least 20 percent of its “significant 
roles” go to Black, Asian or other minority backgrounds (BAME). The British Broadcasting 
Company (BBC) has a similar plan to increase BAME representation to 15 percent over a period 
of three years starting in 2014 (Sweney, 2014). In 2015 Swedish broadcasting company SVT 
introduced a similar policy to increase media visibility of minority groups (TT, 2015). 
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theft and larceny. Finally, I show that media visibility of LGBT characters does not affect the 
rate of hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity the following year. Taken together, this 
suggests that I capture the causal effect of general media visibility of people of colour on social 
tolerance towards people of colour.  
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to the small number of 
studies on the determinants on hate crimes (e.g. Gale et al., 2002; Green and Rich, 1998; Kruger 
and Pischke, 1997). Within this literature, this paper is the first study the role of media visibility. 
Second, this paper relates to the literature on the effects of media on a variety of outcomes. Many 
of these study the role of targeted media in shaping voting behaviour and political outcomes 
(DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Gerber et al., 2011). A smaller group of papers study the effect of 
(negative) radio propaganda on nationalism and genocide (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-
Drott, 2014). Banerjee and Datta Gupta’s (2015) study the effect of a TV show with a strong 
positive social message on caste-based discriminatory behaviour in India. As far as I am aware, 
this study is the first to look at the role of general media visibility of people of colour on 
television on social tolerance towards people of colour. By looking at non-targeted media 
visibility, it is therefore perhaps the most related to the literature on the effect of media exposure 
through the introduction of (cable) television on individual behaviour and beliefs on divorce, 
fertility, domestic violence, and female autonomy, as well as cognitive skills, voter turnout and 
public spending  (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009; Ferrara et al., 2012; Gentzkow, 2006; Gentzkow 
and Shapiro, 2008; Jensen and Oster, 2009; Kearney and Levine 2015; Strömberg, 2004) and 
perhaps the closest to Mastrorocco and Minale (2016) who look at the role of exposure to media 
in shaping beliefs and perceptions, in particular crime perceptions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides some 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the identification strategy. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results. Section 5 presents the results from a set of specification checks and placebo 
tests. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Data and descriptive statistics 
This study combines data from a number of sources. Information on the number of hate crimes 
and motivating bias in each state comes from the FBI’s hate crime master file and was provided 
by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD). Information on alternative crimes 
comes from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. Information on people of colour on broadcasting 
networks comes from GLAAD (formerly the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation), 
and time spent watching television comes from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS).8 
Socioeconomic and demographic variables come from the US Census and the Jewish Yearbook.9 
Data on per capita alcohol consumption comes from the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism.10 Data on the number of hate tweets after Barack Obama’s re-election in 2012 
comes from Floating Sheep and data on the number of hate groups was kindly provided by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center.11,12 Table 1 and Table 2 present the definitions and descriptive 
statistics of the key variables. 
 
TABLE 1—DEFINITION OF KEY VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS 
Name of variable Definition 
  
Hate crime rate Total number of hate crimes motivated by race or 
ethnicity per 100.000 state population, after adjusting for 
state population coverage of submitting agencies  
Ln(hate crime rate) The natural logarithm of the hate crime rate 
Ln(real GDP per capita) State-level logged real GDP per capita 
 
8
 URL: https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/; www.fbi.gov; www.glaad.org; 
www.bls.gov/tus. 
9 URL: www.census.gov; www.ajcarchives.org. 
10 http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/surveillance102/CONS13.pdf 
11 Floating Sheep (floatingsheep.org) is the homepage of a research team at the Department of 
Geography at the University of Kentucky, USA. The department uses digital online life and you 
(DOLLY), which contains billions of geolocated tweets that allows for research and analysis. 
Research using DOLLY has been published in several academic journals. 
12 URL: https://www.splcenter.org. 
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Unemployment rate Percent of state population that is unemployed 
Police 
 
Percent of state GDP allocated toward police and law 
enforcement 
Jew Percent of state population that is Jewish 
Black or African American 
 
Percent of state population that is Black or African-
American 
Median age for men State-level median age for men 
Median age for women State-level median age for women 
Minimum bachelor’s 
Percent of state population with at least a bachelor’s 
degree 
Alcohol consumption 
Per capita number of units of alcohol (ethanol) consumed 
in each state, based on population ages 14 and older 
Prison 
Number of incarcerated individuals per 100.000 state 
population 
Same-sex couples 
 
Percent  of state population who report that they live in a 
same-sex relationship 
Ln(Larceny) 
 
The natural logarithm number of the number of larceny 
crimes per 100.000 state population. Adjusted by the FBI 
for underreporting 
Ln(Motor theft) 
 
The natural logarithm number of the number of motor 
vehicle thefts per 100.000 state population. Adjusted by 
the FBI for underreporting 
 
 
TABLE 2—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MAIN VARIABLES 
Name of variable Definition 
  
Hate crime rate  1.424 
 (0.894) 
Ln(Hate crime rate) 0.129 
 (0.724) 
ln(real GDP per capita) 10.736 
 (0.180) 
Unemployment rate 7.121 
 (2.168) 
Police 0.574 
 (0.129) 
Jew 1.453 
 (1.800) 
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Black or African American 9.076 
 (7.707) 
Medan age for men 36.533 
 (2.359) 
Medan age for women 39.122 
 (2.531) 
Minimum Bachelor 28.084 
 (4.979) 
Alcohol 2.432 
 (0.549) 
Prison  389.824 
 (123.002) 
Same-sex marriage 0.493  
 (0.181) 
Ln(Larceny) 7.568 
 (0.199) 
Ln(Motor vehicle theft) 5.267 
 (0.503) 
Observations 262 
Notes: The sample consists of states where the average population coverage of hate crimes 
between 2007 and 2013 is above 80 percent and there is full information for all variables. 
 
2.1. Hate crime data 
Hate crime data originally comes from the FBI hate crime master file. The FBI has published 
crime statistics each year since 1995 in its Uniform Crime Report and the National Archive of 
Criminal Justice Data provides the data in an accessible format. This analysis uses the FBI’s 
definition of hate crime as it applies to the Uniform Crime Reports Hate Crime Statistics 
Program. A hate crime is defined as a crime “motivated by racial, religious, disability, sexual 
orientation, and ethnicity/national origin basis” (FBI, 2000). In other words, a hate crime is a 
crime against a member of a group simply because they belong to that group (US Department of 
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Justice, 1990).13 The biases covered by the FBI statistics are race, religion, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity/national origin, and disability, and the FBI statistics include annual state-level data on 
the number of hate crimes reported to the FBI and the bias that motivated the hate crime.  
Figure 1 shows the 1992–2013 development of the total number of hate crimes reported to the 
FBI, the number of participating agencies, and the percent of the US population covered by the 
reporting agencies. The development of the number of submitting agencies and the percentage of 
the population covered closely follow each other. This is expected as different agencies cover 
different regions of the United States. Figure 1 also shows a sharp increase in the number of 
agencies submitting statistics and the percentage of the US population covered between 1992 and 
1996, followed by a trend of gradually increasing coverage up until and including 2011. During 
this period, the number of agencies submitting data increases from 6181 to 14575. This trend is 
broken in 2012 when there is a large drop in the number of participating agencies to 12022, and 
the population coverage falls from 92 percent in 2011 to 79 percent in 2012. There is also a large 
drop in the total number of hate crimes from 6222 to 5796. Figure 1 highlights the importance to 
take population coverage into account when analysing hate crimes. The proportion of the state 
population covered by the reporting agencies also varies across state and year, and the number of 
hate crimes reported to the FBI is most likely not the same as the true number of hate crimes 
committed.  
 
 
13 Medoff (1999) lists several characteristics of a hate crime that have been found to separate it 
from other crimes (for example assault, homicide, and robbery). First, the perpetrators are less 
likely to know the victim (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1985). Second, the hate crimes tend to 
include personal violence and be excessively brutal (Levin and McDevitt, 1993). Third, property 
is likely to be destroyed or damaged and not stolen (Berk, 1990). Fourth, the perpetrators are 
often first-time offenders (Harry, 1990). Fifth, hate crimes also often include a larger cost of 
committing the crime to the perpetrators since the offenders often have to search for the victim in 
areas where they do not themselves live (Flanney, 1997). 
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FIGURE 1. TOTAL NUMBER OF HATE CRIMES, REPORTING AGENCIES, AND PERCENT POPULATION 
COVERED 1992-2013 
 
The outcome variable in the analysis is the logged total number of hate crimes motivated by 
the victim’s race or ethnicity per 100.000 state population, after adjusting for the population 
share covered by the agencies submitting the data to the FBI. I am able to exclude hate crimes 
motivated by an anti-white bias and capture the rate of hate crimes of people that can be assumed 
to be people of colour. I divide the number of hate crimes by the proportion of the state 
population covered by the reporting agencies to obtain an estimate of the number of hate crimes 
that would be reported if 100 percent of the state’s population were covered by the reporting 
agencies. This procedure may introduce a source of error in the data. States with low population 
coverage are likely to have less precision in their data compared with states with high population 
coverage. The low precision can lead to an overestimate or underestimate of the actually 
committed number of hate crimes, depending on the relationship between reporting behaviour of 
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agencies and the prevalence of hate crimes.14 Also, some states are inconsistent in their 
reporting. One such state is Alabama, which has a population coverage that ranges from 79 
percent in 2010 to 3 percent in 2012. Inconsistent reporting is a potential problem if it means that 
state officials do not take hate crime reporting seriously or that the state’s curriculum for 
identifying, reporting, and responding to hate crimes has changed throughout time. To address 
the issue of underreporting by agencies, I exclude states where the average population coverage 
between 2007 and 2013 is below 80 percent. This roughly corresponds to excluding the bottom 
25 percent.15 The mean hate crime rate in the final sample is 1.42 hate crimes per 100.000 state 
population. The three states with the lowest rate of hate crimes motivated by the victims’ race or 
ethnicity are Iowa (0.10), Florida (0.16), and Wyoming (0.17). The three states with the highest 
crime rates are District of Columbia (4.53), New Jersey (4.40), and North Dakota (4.16). This 
does not necessarily mean that states with low hate crime rates are more tolerant. For example, it 
could reflect that states differ in their attitudes toward hate crimes, reporting behaviour, and 
police training. 
2.2. A Measure of media visibility 
I use data from two sources to construct a novel state-level measure of media visibility over 
time. National-level data on the proportion of scripted series regular people of colour characters 
on broadcasting networks for each season between 2006 and 2012 comes from GLAAD.16,17 The 
 
14 If the agencies that supply data to the FBI are in the areas where crimes take place, then it 
leads to an overestimate of the true number of hate crimes committed. If, on the other hand, 
agencies tend to not report hate crimes, then it leads to an underestimate of the true number of 
hate crimes committed. 
15 The bottom 25 percent have an average population coverage below 82 percent 
16 Since 2005, GLAAD has published an annual report called “Where Are We on TV” in 
which the organization presents statistics on the total and proportion of scripted series regular 
characters on broadcasting and cable networks who belong to different minority groups. Since 
2006, the report has included people of color. “People of color” refers to individuals that are 
Black, Latino/a, Asian-Pacific Islander or “others”. 
17 The television season starts in June and ends in May the following year. 
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broadcasting networks included in GLAAD’s statistics are ABC, CBS, FOX, NBC, and The 
CW.18 Figure 2 shows the proportion of people of colour on broadcasting networks between 
2006 and 2012. The proportion varies between 0.21 and 0.24. 
State-level data on the number of hours that the state population watches nonreligious 
television and movies in 2003 comes from the ATUS. Figure 3 shows that there is large variation 
in the total number of hours. In Delaware, the population spends 1155 hours watching 
nonreligious television and movies in 2003. This is almost twice as much as North Dakota where 
the population spends 600.5 hours watching nonreligious television and movies in 2003.  
 
 
FIGURE 2. PROPORTION OF SERIES REGULAR PEOPLE OF COLOR, 2006-2012 
 
18 The main difference between a broadcasting network and a cable network is that a 
broadcasting network airs content through public airways and is financed via advertisement, 
whereas a cable network airs content through cable operators and is financed via a fee for each 
subscriber. Since viewers pay a monthly fee for a cable network, the individuals who have access 
to shows on cable networks may be a selected sample with characteristics that correlate with 
social tolerance. Also, cable networks have been known to produce shows that target certain 
segments of the population. To avoid any selection bias, I use statistics only from broadcasting 
networks. 
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FIGURE 3. STATE-LEVEL NUMBER OF HOURS OF TELEVISION WATCHING IN 2003 
 
To construct a state-level measure of media visibility of people of colour over time I multiply 
the state-level number of hours of television watching in 2003 by the proportion of people of 
colour on broadcasting networks at the national level between 2006 and 2012. This gives me a 
variable that can be interpreted as a rough measure of the state-level media visibility of people of 
colour on broadcasting networks between 2006 and 2012.  
I use the predetermined 2003 viewing statistics instead of contemporaneous not to confound 
the effect of media visibility on the hate crime rate with changing habits of television watching 
over time. It is likely that the state-level of number of hours of television watching in 2003 is 
correlated with future state-level of number of hours of television watching, but it is unlikely that 
television watching in 2003 is correlated with any omitted variables that jointly influence media 
visibility of people of colour in year t-1 and the hate crime rate in year t. Figure 4 shows the 
correlation between the state-level number of hours spent watching television in 2003 and each 
year between 2006 and 2012. As expected, there is a positive correlation between 2003’s value 
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and all future years used in the analysis. The positive correlation confirms that the states that 
watch relatively more television in 2003 keep on watching relatively more television between 
2006 and 2012. It is therefore possible to use the 2003 predetermined state level television 
watching to estimate future values of state level television watching.  
Because of the construction of the media visibility variable, all states experience the same 
direction of change and proportional change in the number of hours over time. Since states watch 
different amounts of television, however, the size of the absolute change differs between the 
states. The “treatment” and “control” groups are therefore differentiated by the 2003 
predetermined number of hours of television watching. The mean number of hours of media 
visibility per year is 192 and there is variation over the years. The overall standard deviation in 
the sample is 26 hours, but there is a large difference between the between- and within-variation 
in media visibility. The between standard deviation is 25.5 hours, whereas the within standard 
deviation is 6.5 hours.  
 
FIGURE 4. CORRELATION BETWEEN HOURS OF TELEVISION IN 2003 AND 2006-2012. 
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To illustrate the variation that I use for identification, Figure 5 shows the estimated total 
number of hours and change in hours of media visibility of people of colour between 2006 and 
2012 for the two states with the most and least number of hours of television watching in 2003: 
Delaware and North Dakota. As can be seen, both the total and the change in the number of 
hours of media visibility differ between the states. The variation is larger in Delaware (Standard 
deviation: 9.25 hours) since the state population watches more television than the state 
population in North Dakota (Standard deviation: 4.8 hours).19 The distributions of the key 
variables logged hate crime rate and media visibility are illustrated in the two histograms in 
Figure 6. Both variables are normally distributed.  
 
 
FIGURE 5. TOTAL AND CHANGE IN MEDIA VISIBILITY FOR DELAWARE AND NORTH DAKOTA 
 
 
19 Remember that I use the state-level number of hours of television to get an estimate of state-
level media visibility of people of color and not to estimate the actual number of hours of media 
visibility. 
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FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF THE LOGGED HATE CRIME RATE AND HOURS OF MEDIA VISIBILITY 
2.3. Additional control variables 
I have state-level data on two sets of time-varying control variables. The first set includes 
socioeconomic variables. I include information on logged real GDP per capita and the 
unemployment rate. I also include information on the percentage of state GDP that is allocated 
toward police and law enforcement. Increasing the likelihood that offenders are caught, 
prosecuted, and sentenced, and taking actions that deter crime is one of the direct ways that states 
can influence the hate crime rate. Increasing the percentage of GDP allocated toward law 
enforcement can have two opposite effects on the hate crime rate. It can increase the hate crime 
rate because more individuals are caught, prosecuted, and convicted of the offense. Or, it can act 
as a preventive action and decrease the hate crime rate. I also include a measure of the number of 
incarcerated individuals per 100.000 state population.  
The second set of controls is demographic variables. I include information on the percent of 
the state population that has at least a bachelor’s degree. Education is said to be one of the most 
important factors when it comes to increasing social tolerance, and so the variable is expected to 
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have a negative effect on the hate crime rate. I also use information on the percent of the state 
population that is Black or African-American and the percent of the population that is Jewish. 
Both groups are common targets of hate crimes, but it is unclear whether an increase in the 
percentage of the minority group should have a positive or negative effect. An increase in the 
African-American and Jewish populations can lead to a more diverse and tolerant society 
because of greater interaction and familiarity, thus reducing hate crimes. Or, it can increase the 
fears that the minority group is trying to challenge the dominant group, thus increasing hate 
crimes (Becker, 1957). I also include information on the median age for women and men. 
Younger individuals tend to be more tolerant, but it is also younger individuals who tend to 
commit hate crimes. Therefore, it is unclear whether median age is expected to be positively or 
negatively related to the hate crime rate. I also include information on the percentage of same-
sex couples at the state level. It is likely that there are more same-sex couples in states that are 
more tolerant, and changes in the percent of same-sex couples can therefore be thought to 
capture state-level changes when it comes to social tolerance. I also include information on the 
per capita number of units of alcohol (units of ethanol) consumed in each state to capture any 
effect of alcohol consumption on spontaneous violent behaviour towards minority groups. 
Lastly, I have information on motor vehicle theft and larceny crime rates from the FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports. Unlike hate crimes, the FBI adjusts these data for underreporting by 
agencies. I use this data in two ways. First, it allows me to control for contemporaneous crime 
rates in the main analysis. Second, it allows me to perform a falsification test. Specifically, I use 
data on motor vehicle theft and larceny to test whether media visibility appears to affect these 
crimes. I expect the effect of media visibility on these crimes to be very small and insignificant 
since few hate crimes are classified as motor vehicle theft or larceny. 
3. Identification strategy 
To distinguish the effect of media visibility on the hate crime rate from confounding factors, I 
exploit the between-state variation induced by the fact that states are exposed to different 
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amounts of media visibility of people of colour because they watch different amounts of 
television. If media visibility is effective in changing attitudes and tolerance towards people of 
colour, then I expect to see relatively larger changes in rates of hate crimes in states with a larger 
television viewership. 
Formally, I estimate a state fixed effects OLS panel data model. I follow convention and use 
the log of the outcome per 100.000 state population as the dependent variable (Cheng and 
Hoekstra, 2013). The advantage with state fixed effects is that it controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity across states and exploits state-level variation over time to estimate the effect of 
media visibility of people of colour on the hate crime rate. Formally, the model can be written as: 
        1            ln hate crime!,! = β!Media Visibility!,!!! + β!X!,! + s! +  u! + γ!×u! + ν!,! 
 
Here, ln hate crime!,!  is the logged state population coverage adjusted number of hate crimes 
motivated by race or ethnicity per 100.000 population in state i in  year t. Media Visibility!,!!! is 
the one-year lagged media visibility of scripted series regular people of color characters or 
persons on broadcasting networks in state i in year t. It is constructed by multiplying the 
proportion of people of colour characters on broadcasting networks in year t with the 
predetermined 2003 state-level number of hours spent watching nonreligious television and 
movies. X!,! is a vector of control variables that includes the two sets of socioeconomic and 
demographic control variables, and the two crime rates. s! and u! control for state and year fixed 
effects. γ!×u!are US Census region-by-year fixed effects that allow states in different regions to 
follow different trends and allow for region specific shocks over time.20 ν!,! is a robust error term 
clustered at the state level. The model is estimated with weights for state population size. 
Because the dependent variable is logged and media visibility is linear, β! is interpreted as the 
 
20
 The US Census regions are West, Midwest, Northeast, and South. 
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β!×100 percent change in the number of hate crimes per 100.000 state population associated 
with a unit increase in the media visibility of people of colour per year.  
I use the one-year lagged value of media visibility for three reasons. First, it is unlikely that 
there is an instantaneous effect from an increased exposure to minority characters since the 
audience has to build up a sense of bond with them. This is similar to the introduction of a new 
friend in one’s social network. It takes time to form a friendship and form beliefs and opinions 
about that person. Second, the television season runs from the middle of one year to the middle 
of the next year. This means that the exposure to people of colour characters in year t is actually 
only for the latter six months of the year. The rest of the data is for all 12 months of the year, 
which therefore also includes last season’s exposure to people of colour characters. Using the 
contemporary value will therefore most likely bias the estimate. Third, it reduces the risk of 
reverse causality in which people are exposed to more people of colour on television because 
they are watch more television and commit fewer hate crimes.   
4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
I now turn to whether media visibility of people of colour affects the hate crime rate. To the 
extent that media visibility affects social tolerance and the media visibility has been positive, I 
expect that there is a negative effect of an increase in media visibility on the hate crime rate the 
following year.  
I start with the raw relationship between the one year lagged media visibility and hate crime 
rate.  Figure 7 shows the correlation between the two variables. There is a negative relationship 
between the number of hours of media visibility of people of colour and the logged hate crime 
rate the following year.  
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FIGURE 7. LAGGED NUMBER OF HOURS OF MEDIA VISIBILITY AND LOGGED HATE CRIME RATE  
 
Next, I investigate the relationship more closely and estimate equation (1). Table 3 presents the 
results. All model specifications include state and year fixed effects. Column 1 presents the 
results when only the one-year lagged media visibility is included. Column 2 adds 
socioeconomic and demographic controls that vary at the state-year level. Column 3 adds US 
Census region-by-year fixed effects. Column 4 adds crime rates for motor vehicle theft and 
larceny to capture general trends in crime. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level 
and weights for state population size is used. 
The results in Table 3 provide evidence of a significant and negative effect of media visibility 
of people of colour on the rate of hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity. The effect of media 
visibility on the hate crime rate is significant in all models that include state-level controls, US 
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Census region-by-year fixed effects, and contemporaneous crime rates.21 The results do not 
change much depending on the model specification. An increase in media visibility of people of 
colour appears to increase social tolerance and lower the hate crime rate. 
 
TABLE 3—FIXED EFFECTS RESULTS ON THE EFFECT OF MEDIA VISIBILITY ON THE LOGGED HATE CRIME 
RATE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Media visibilityt-1 -0.0418 -0.0560** -0.0502** -0.0494** 
 (0.0255) (0.0208) (0.0213) (0.0219) 
     
Observations 265 262 262 262 
R2 0.266 0.330 0.435 0.440 
Number of states 38 38 38 38 
     
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Region-by-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Contemporaneous crime rates    Yes 
Notes: The table shows fixed effects results. Each column represents a separate regression. The 
dependent variable is the logged total number of hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity per 
100.000 state population, adjusted for population coverage by reporting agencies. The unit of 
observation is state. The cut-off is an average state population coverage above 80 percent. 
Robust standard errors clustered at state level are in parenthesis. The model is estimated with 
weights for state population. State controls include logged real GDP per capita (2005 dollars), 
the unemployment rate, percentage of GDP allocated towards the police, percentage of the 
population with at least a bachelor’s degree, percentage population that is Jewish, percentage of 
the population that is Black or African-American, the median age for women and men, 
percentage same-sex couples, number of incarcerated individuals per 100.000 state population, 
and the number of alcohol units consumed. The number of observations is reduced in column 2-4 
because of missing values for some state controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
21 I have performed the analysis without the three states with the highest number of hours of 
television watching (Delaware, Oklahoma, and Ohio) to test if these three states are driving the 
results. As expected, the estimated size of the effect falls slightly but the interpretation of the 
results does not change. 
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It is possible that the effect of an increase in media visibility on the hate crime rate is linear 
and not non-linear. Therefore, I also use the (non-logged) rate of hate crimes motivated by race 
or ethnicity per 100.000 state population at the outcome variable of interest. The results remain 
the same. An increase in media visibility leads to fewer hate crimes per 100.000 state population 
the following year.22,23  
 
4.2. Heterogeneous effects 
The result in Table 3 focuses on the effect of media visibility on the hate crime rate for the 
average state in the data. It is possible, however, that the effect of media visibility on the hate 
crime rate depends on whether the state has a relatively high or low degree of social tolerance. 
For example, the effect can be lower in relatively tolerant states because the state populations 
already have a high degree of interaction with and social tolerance toward minorities, or higher 
because the state populations are more willing to reflect on their preconceived opinions and 
beliefs about minority groups. Similarly, the effect of media visibility can be higher in less 
tolerant states because state populations are less likely to interact with minority groups and 
therefore have the most to learn from media visibility of a minority group, or lower because the 
state populations have such low degree of tolerance that they are less affected by media visibility 
of minority groups. 
In this section, I use two definitions of state tolerance to study whether the effect of media 
visibility is greater in states with a relatively high or low degree of social tolerance. The first one 
is former membership status in the Confederate States of America (CSA). The second is whether 
the state had a relatively high or low amount of hate speech on Twitter after US President Barack 
 
22 Results available upon request. 
23 I am unable to use the logged media visibility as the treatment since this would get rid of the 
between-state variation in the media visibility. 
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Obama’s 2012 re-election. On the whole, my findings suggest that the answer depends on which 
of the definitions of social tolerance is used.  
4.2.1 Former Confederate States of America member status 
The first definition of a state’s level of social tolerance is based on whether the state used to be 
a member of the CSA. The CSA was a confederation of secessionist states that wanted to keep or 
expand slavery. It was formed after the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and existed 
between 1861 and 1865 during the American Civil War. The seven founding states in the Deep 
South region were Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Texas. Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia in the Upper South later joined (Foner 
and Garraty, 1991). The confederate states have a history of being conservative and less tolerant 
toward minorities, especially Blacks and African-Americans. 
Table 4 presents the result when I add an interactive variable that captures the additional effect 
of media visibility of people of colour on the hate crime rate in the 11 states that used to be 
members of the CSA to the model. The coefficient of the additional effect in former CSA states 
is close to zero and insignificant in all model specifications. This result does not support the 
hypothesis that the effect of media visibility differs between states of different degrees of social 
tolerance. 
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TABLE 4—HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BY FORMER CONFEDERATE STATE STATUS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Media visibilityt-1 -0.0372 -0.0498** -0.0502** -0.0493** 
 (0.0242) (0.0218) (0.0211) (0.0218) 
Media visibilityt-1×Confederatei -0.00400 -0.00614 -0.000117 0.000539 
 (0.00877) (0.00739) (0.0154) (0.0148) 
     
Observations 265 262 262 262 
R2 0.268 0.333 0.435 0.440 
Number of states 38 38 38 38 
     
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Region-by-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Contemporaneous crime rates    Yes 
Notes: The table shows fixed effects results. Each column represents a separate regression. The 
dependent variable is the logged total number of hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity per 
100.000 state population, adjusted for population coverage by reporting agencies. The unit of 
observation is state. The cut-off is an average state population coverage above 80 percent. 
Robust standard errors clustered at state level are in parenthesis. The model is estimated with 
weights for state population. State controls include logged real GDP per capita (2005 dollars), 
the unemployment rate, percentage of GDP allocated towards the police, percentage of the 
population with at least a bachelor’s degree, percentage population that is Jewish, percentage of 
the population that is Black or African-American, the median age for women and men, 
percentage same-sex couples, number of incarcerated individuals per 100.000 state population, 
and the number of alcohol units consumed. The number of observations is reduced in column 2-4 
because of missing values for some state controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.2.2 Hate speech on Twitter following US President Obama’s re-election in 2012 
The second definition of a state’s level of social tolerance uses a contemporaneous measure. 
There was a large spike in hate speech on Twitter the day after US President Barack Obama’s re-
election in November 2012. Researchers at Floating Sheep collected all geocoded hate tweets 
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between November 1 and November 7 in 2012 and used these to calculate a measure of how 
much hate speech there was in each state. To do so, they first aggregated all geocoded hate 
tweets (number of total tweets = 395) to state level and normalized them by comparing them 
with the total number of geocoded tweets in that state during the same period.24 They then 
calculated a type of Location Quotient (LQ) measure that captures each state’s share of hate 
speech relative to its total number of tweets.25 If the LQ is equal to 1, then the state has relatively 
the same number of hate speech tweets as its total number of tweets after the 2012 election. An 
LQ above (below) 1 therefore suggests that the state had more (less) racist tweets after the 2012 
election than it normally does.26  
Table 5 presents the LQ scores of the states included in Floating Sheep’s analysis.27 Many of 
the racist tweets were from southern states. This is expected, as these are the more historically 
conservative states. However, some states stand out. For example, North Dakota and Utah, two 
states that were never a part of the CSA have relatively high LQ values.28  
The LQ measure is interesting because not only does it capture the level of online racist 
behaviour at the state level but also an “in the spur of the moment” reaction and expression of 
hate that can act as an alternative indicator of the state level of social tolerance to, for example, 
population surveys or historical definitions. Since hate crimes tend to be more violent than other 
crimes, it is also possible that states where there was more of an emotional reaction to the re-
election of an African-American to remain President also have more people who are more likely 
to react emotionally when faced with a person who belongs to a minority group that they have a 
 
24
 Geocoded tweets make up only about 1 to 5 percent of the total number of tweets. The 
number of hate tweets is expected to be much larger (floatingsheep.org). 
25 The formula for the LQ used by Floating Sheep is:  LQ! = !"#$ !"##$%! !"#$ !"##$%!!"!!!  !"#$% !"##$!! !"#$% !"##$%!!"!!!     
26 Matthew Zook. “Mapping Racist Tweets in Response to President Obama’s Re-election. 
November 8, 2012. URL: www.floatingsheep.org 
27
 Some states are excluded due to lack of geocoded tweets. 
28 Matthew Zook. “Mapping Racist Tweets in Response to President Obama’s Re-election. 
November 8, 2012. URL: www.floatingsheep.org 
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negative bias toward. It is also possible that it is a better indicator of a type of racism that is 
visible only under extreme events. 
 
TABLE 5—RANKING OF STATES BY THEIR LQ MEASURE OF THE LEVEL OF HATE SPEECH 
ON TWITTER 
State LQ value 
Alabama 8.1 
Mississippi 7.4 
Georgia 3.6 
North Dakota 3.5 
Utah 3.5 
Louisiana 3.3 
Tennessee 3.1 
Missouri 3.0 
West Virginia 2.8 
Minnesota 2.7 
Kansas 2.4 
Kentucky 1.9 
Arkansas 1.9 
Wisconsin 1.9 
Colorado 1.9 
New Mexico 1.6 
Illinois 1.5 
North Carolina 1.5 
Virginia 1.5 
Oregon 1.5 
District of Columbia 1.5 
Ohio 1.4 
South Carolina 1.4 
Texas 1.3 
Florida 1.3 
Delaware 1.3 
Nebraska 1.1 
Washington 1.0 
Maine 0.9 
New Hampshire 0.8 
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Pennsylvania 0.7 
Michigan 0.6 
Massachusetts 0.5 
New Jersey 0.5 
California 0.5 
Oklahoma 0.5 
Connecticut 0.5 
Nevada 0.5 
Iowa 0.4 
Indiana 0.3 
New York 0.3 
Arizona 0.2 
Notes: This table shows the LQ measure for the 42 states with enough tweets to be included in 
the analysis performed by Floating Sheep. 
 
I use the LQ measure to construct the variable Hate speech. It is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the state has an LQ measure above the median, which is 1.81, and 0 if it has an LQ 
measure below the median. This classifies 15 states as having a low level of social tolerance and 
27 states as having a high level of social tolerance. I then interact this variable with the media 
visibility variable to construct a variable that captures the additional effect of media visibility 
that is specific for states with a low level of tolerance. Table 6 presents the results. The estimated 
general effect of media visibility of people of colour on the hate crime rate is larger compared to 
the results presented in Table 3. A possible explanation is that the states in this analysis are 
required to have some hate speech tweets for the LQ to be calculated. This sample may therefore 
exclude the most tolerant states.29 
 More interestingly, the estimated additional effect of media visibility of people of colour in 
states where there was a lot of hate speech on Twitter after President Obama’s re-election is 
significant and negative in all but the most basic model. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
 
29 The estimated overall effect of media visibility on the hate crime rate falls by around 1 
percentage point when I also include states that are not used to calculate the LQ measure and set 
the Hate Speech dummy equal to zero for these states. 
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the effect of media visibility differs between states of different degrees of social tolerance and 
that the effect is greater in states where social tolerance is lower. 
  
TABLE 6—HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BY RACIST TWEETS AFTER US PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA’S 
2012 REELECTION 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Media visibilityt-1 -0.0544* -0.0743*** -0.0849*** -0.0833*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0231) 
Media visibilityt-1×Hate speechi -0.0125 -0.0151* -0.0190** -0.0184** 
 (0.00817) (0.00847) (0.00817) (0.00890) 
     
Observations 216 213 213 213 
R2 0.278 0.347 0.479 0.481 
Number of states 31 31 31 31 
     
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Region-by-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Contemporaneous crime rates    Yes 
Notes: The table shows fixed effects results. Each column represents a separate regression. The 
dependent variable is the logged total number of hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity per 
100.000 state population, adjusted for population coverage by reporting agencies The unit of 
observation is state. The cut-off is an average state population coverage above 80 percent. 
Robust standard errors clustered at state level are in parenthesis. The model is estimated with 
weights for state population. State controls include logged real GDP per capita (2005 dollars), 
the unemployment rate, percentage of GDP allocated towards the police, percentage of the 
population with at least a bachelor’s degree, percentage population that is Jewish, percentage of 
the population that is Black or African-American, the median age for women and men, 
percentage same-sex couples, number of incarcerated individuals per 100.000 state population, 
and the number of alcohol units consumed. The number of observations is reduced in column 2-4 
because of missing values for some state controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.2.3. Discussion of the results when looking at heterogeneous effects 
The findings presented in this section provide some evidence that the effect of media visibility 
on social tolerance is greater in states that are less tolerant. What can explain the different results 
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when using two different classifications of tolerance? A possible explanation is that former CSA 
member status does not capture today’s state-level degree of tolerance, whereas the amount of 
hate speech on Twitter does. For example, North Dakota and Utah are classified as tolerant when 
defined by former CSA status but intolerant when defined by hate speech on Twitter. If the 
landscape of tolerance, or at least the landscape of the expression of tolerance in terms of hate 
crimes, is different from what it was 150 years ago, then using hate speech online may be a better 
way of classifying states as tolerant or not. 
Another possible explanation is that individuals in former CSA member states are less tolerant 
but that the hate crime rate does not capture this. This may be because racism is more accepted in 
these states or that hate crimes are not prioritized or recognized. The average hate crime rate for 
crimes motivated by race is 0.98 in former CSA member states and 1.46 in former non-CSA 
member states. This discrepancy might be because the attitude toward hate crimes is different in 
these states or because the hate crime legislation is different. 
4.3.  Who does media visibility affect? Hate groups as an alternative outcome 
If media visibility has an effect on social tolerance to the degree that it affects the hate crime 
rate, then another question is who it affects – those with relatively more or less tolerance towards 
minority groups? To test whether media affects people that can be assumed to be very intolerant, 
I use information provided by The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) on the number of hate 
groups in each state between 2007 and 2013. 30 I classify the hate groups into racist or non-racist 
toward people of colour depending on the views that they promote. Examples of hate groups that 
are racist towards people of colour are Ku Klux Klan groups, neo-Nazi groups, White nationalist 
groups, racist skinhead groups, neo-Confederates, anti-immigration, racist music groups, and 
Holocaust deniers. The non-racist hate groups include anti-gay groups and Black separatist 
groups. I calculate the number of racist hate groups per 100.000 state population. The mean 
number of racist hate groups is 0.31 per 100.000 state population. An advantage with the hate 
 
30 URL: http://www.splcenter.org 
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group data compared to the hate crime data is that I do not have to take reporting behaviour by 
agencies into account. This increases the number of observations. 
 
TABLE 7—THE EFFECT OF MEDIA VISIBILITY ON THE NUMBER OF HATE GROUPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Media visibilityt-1 -0.00135 -0.00213 -0.00358 -0.00358 
 (0.00479) (0.00506) (0.00544) (0.00547) 
     
Observations 343 338 338 338 
R2 0.0534 0.131 0.185 0.187 
Number of states 49 49 49 49 
     
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Region-by-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Contemporaneous crime rates    Yes 
Notes: The table shows fixed effects results. Each column represents a separate regression. The 
dependent variable is the logged total number of racist hate groups per 100.000 state population. 
The unit of observation is state. Robust standard errors clustered at state level are in parenthesis. 
The model is estimated with weights for state population. State controls include logged real GDP 
per capita (2005 dollars), the unemployment rate, percentage of GDP allocated towards the 
police, percentage of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree, percentage population that 
is Jewish, percentage of the population that is Black or African-American, the median age for 
women and men, percentage same-sex couples, number of incarcerated individuals per 100.000 
state population, and the number of alcohol units consumed. The number of observations is 
reduced in column 2-4 because of missing values for some state controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
Table 7 presents the results for all types of racist hate groups. The effect of media visibility is 
close to zero and insignificant in all model specifications. This suggests that while media 
visibility of people of colour does seem to be able to influence individuals’ social tolerance, the 
way it does so is limited in the sense that individuals that are very intolerant are not affected. 
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This suggests that other methods are required to increase social tolerance of individuals that are 
attracted to these types of groups.31  
Does this finding cast a doubt on the main results using hate crimes? I do not believe so. The 
relationship between hate groups and hate crimes is ambiguous and it is not a priori obvious. On 
the one hand, hate groups may encourage criminal or violent behaviour that is in line with the 
beliefs of the hate group. On the other hand, hate groups may allow like-minded individuals to 
meet and discuss their frustrations, thereby making them less likely of criminal or violent 
behaviour (Mulholland, 2011). The results are in line with Ryan and Leeson (2010) who finds 
that the number of hate groups is not related to the number of hate crimes.  
5. Checks and placebo tests  
Having established that there is a negative effect of media visibility of people of colour on the 
rate of hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity the following year, I now present several 
checks and tests to demonstrate that the assumptions of the identification strategy hold true.  
In order for the measure of media visibility to capture the effect of media on social tolerance, 
the state-level television watching habits should not change due to changes in media visibility of 
people of colour. Table 8, column (1) presents the results when the one-year lagged media 
visibility variable is used to predict the number of hours of television watching the following 
year. Media visibility does not predict the number of hours spent watching television. 
It is possible that producers of shows respond to changes in the hate crime rate or social 
tolerance in general by changing the number of minority group characters in their shows. If this 
is the case, then this invalidates the identification strategy. I therefore test whether media 
visibility is influenced by last year’s hate crime rate. Table 8, column (2) presents the results. 
The results show little indication that media visibility is influenced by last year’s hate crime rate.  
 
31 It is possible that media visibility influences the number of members of hate groups. 
Unfortunately, I do not have data on the size of the hate groups. 
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One test of the identifying assumptions is to examine whether media visibility of people of 
colour affects crimes that are thought to be unrelated to social tolerance. I therefore examine 
whether media visibility affects the logged motor vehicle theft crime rate and logged larceny 
crime rate. I expect these crime rates to be unaffected by media visibility since relatively few 
hate crimes are classified as motor vehicle theft or larceny. Table 8, column (3) and (4) show the 
results for motor vehicle theft and larceny. The estimate of the effect of media visibility is close 
to zero and insignificant in all model specifications.  
If the theory behind and the identifying assumptions of the model hold, there should be a much 
smaller or no effect of media visibility of LGBT characters on social tolerance towards people of 
colour. I use GLAAD’s data on series regular LGBT characters on broadcasting networks to test 
this. Table 8, column (5) presents the results when I look at the effect of one year lagged media 
visibility of LGBT characters on the rate of hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity. The 
results show no indication that media visibility of LGBT characters matter for social tolerance 
towards people of colour.  
 
TABLE 8—CHECKS AND PLACEBO TESTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Hours of 
television 
watching 
Media 
visibility 
Motor 
vehicle 
theft 
Larceny LGBT 
media 
visibility 
      
Media visibilityt-1 -2.546  0.0030 -0.0002 0.0029 
 (7.023)  (0.0041)
) 
(0.0018) (0.0176) 
Ln(hate crime ratet-1)  0.235    
  (0.196)    
      
Observations 263 225 263 263 262 
R2 0.201 
 
0.993 
 
0.937 0.853 0.433 
 Number of states 38 38 38 38 38 
      
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-by-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contemporaneous crime rates Yes Yes No No Yes 
Notes: The table shows fixed effects results. Each column represents a separate regression. The 
dependent variable is the hate crime rate per 100.000 state population. Column (1) presents the 
results when testing whether media visibility predicts the number of hours of television watching 
the following year. Column (2) presents when testing whether the hate crime rate influences 
media visibility the following year. Column (3) and (4) presents the results when testing whether 
media visibility influences crimes besides hate crimes. Column (5) presents the results when 
testing the effect of LGBT media visibility on the hate crime rate. The cut-off is an average state 
population coverage above 80 percent. Robust standard errors clustered at state level are in 
parenthesis. The model is estimated with weights for state population. State controls include 
logged real GDP per capita (2005 dollars), the unemployment rate, percentage of GDP allocated 
towards the police, percentage of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree, percentage 
population that is Jewish, percentage of the population that is Black or African-American, the 
median age for women and men, percentage same-sex couples, number of incarcerated 
individuals per 100.000 state population, and the number of alcohol units consumed. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of general media visibility of people of colour on social tolerance 
towards people of colour, as measured by the number of hate crimes motivated by race or 
ethnicity. The results show that media visibility matters. An increase in media visibility of people 
of colour significantly reduces the hate crime rate the following year. The result is robust to 
changes in the model specification, a number of checks and placebo tests. The effect is not larger 
in states that used to be members of the pro-slavery secessionist CSA but in states where the 
population is more likely to express emotional and spontaneous outbursts of racism, as measured 
by the state’s relative amount of hate speech on Twitter after US President Barack Obama’s 2012 
re-election. Individuals who are very intolerant, however, do not appear to be affected by media 
visibility, as I find no effect on the number of hate groups.  
My findings show that general media visibility of a minority group can have an important 
effect on the level of social tolerance toward that minority group. This is in line with theories that 
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suggest that the more exposure that individuals have to minority groups, the more correct 
information they receive about them and the more they learn about them and their worldviews. In 
turn, this reduces any prejudice or negative bias that they might have. The findings in this study 
are also in line with results in other studies that have found that mass media can have an impact 
on individuals’ behaviour and beliefs.  
With respect to policy implications, my findings suggest that an increase in media visibility of 
minority groups can be an important tool to increase social tolerance toward minority groups. In 
a world where countries are becoming more international and multicultural, media visibility that 
is positive and non-stereotypic can be one way to reduce any potential conflict in society that 
may arise between the majority and minority groups. 
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